This
web site is a joint effort by David Chandler (retired physics teacher),
Jonathan Cole (professional engineer), and Nathan Flach (video
archivist). We are all independent 9/11 researchers, and affiliated
with Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth. Our goal has been to
uncover the truth and shed some light on the events of 9/11, each in our
own way.
A review of the history of military orders governing response
to hijackings casts doubt on the idea that the June 1 order
was instrumental in hobbling the military's response on September 11.
The June 1 order superseded the 1997 directive CJCSI 3610.01.
3
The 1997 directive also stipulated that the NMCC
"forward all requests or proposals for DOD military assistance
for piracy (hijacking) to the Secretary of Defense for approval."
The 1997 directive cancels three earlier ones:
MCM-102-92, 24 July 1992,
"Hijacking of Civil Aircraft"
CJCS MOP 51, 13 April 1992,
"Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) of Military and Military Contract Aircraft"
MCM-- 173-90, 14 September 1990,
"Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects"
These earlier documents do not appear to be archived on dtic.mil.
It would be interesting to learn what policy they mandated
for military response to hijackings, and, in particular,
whether it required approval by the Secretary of Defense.
The air defense network had, on September 11th,
predictable and effective procedures for dealing with just such an attack.
Yet it failed to respond in a timely manner until after the attack was over,
more than an hour and a half after it had started.
The official timeline describes a series of events and mode of response
in which the delays are spread out into a number of areas.
There are failures upon failures, in what might be described
as a strategy of layered failures, or failure in depth.
The failures can be divided into four types.
Failures to report:
Based on the official timeline,
the FAA response times for reporting the deviating aircraft
were many times longer than the prescribed times.
Failures to scramble:
NORAD, once notified of the off-course aircraft,
failed to scramble jets from the nearest bases.
Failures to intercept:
Once airborne, interceptors failed to reach their targets
because they flew at small fractions of their top speeds and/or
in the wrong directions.
Failures to redeploy:
Fighters that were airborne and within interception range
of the deviating aircraft
were not redeployed to pursue them.
